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Chapter 1
Introduction
The high yield, or junk', bond market has changed drastically over time. Its
history can be divided into three periods:
* Before the 1970's, all high yield bonds outstanding were "fallen
angels", i.e., originally issued as investment grade bonds but later
downgraded.
* In 1977, investment banks started underwriting original issue junk
bonds. This made junk bonds an important financing tool for emerging
companies.
* Since 1983, junk bonds have been used to finance leveraged buyouts
and other corporate takeovers. This has caused concern in the
financial community over hostile takeovers and the role of high yield
bonds in the economy.
The value of junk bonds outstanding has increased from $7 billion in 1970 to
over $100 billion in 1986. A growing number of mutual funds specializing in junk
bonds has accompanied the growth of the high yield segment of the fixed income
market. As of early 1985, there were approximately 40 high yield mutual funds. In
the early 1970's, before original issue junk bonds were a viable financing tool, there
were only two such funds. Fund analyst Michael Lipper, of Lipper Analytical
Services, claimed that junk bond funds held $6 million as of September, 1984.2
This was approximately twice the amount in funds that buy only conservative
corporate bonds (with a minimum grade of A). Lipper claims that mutual funds
specializing in high yield bonds "far outperformed those that bought U.S.
1High yield bonds are bonds that are rated BB and lower by Standard & Poor's or Baa and lower by
Moody's Investors Service.
2 Robert McGough, High-yield Anxiety, Forbes, September 10, 1984, p. 204.
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government bonds or A-rated corporate bonds" over the five and ten year periods
ending December 1984. From 1980 through 1984, the total return to investors in
U.S. government bond funds, corporate A-rated bond funds and junk bond funds
were 68.56%, 72.50 % and 78.91% respectively. The corresponding 10-year total
returns were 143.0%, 147.6% and 214.5%.3
The future of the high yield market is very uncertain, depending on future
legislation, insider trading probes and a potential recession. This uncertainty
makes it increasingly important to be able to test the performance of high yield
bonds. A model that can describe the returns on junk bonds would help legislators
determine whether investors in these bonds, such as pension funds, wealthy
individuals and now the large number of individual investors who can invest
through mutual funds, are being adequately compensated for the risk involved.
This work attempts to apply such a model to eight high yield bond funds and five
non-high yield bond funds to 1) compare the performance of the different types of
funds, 2) determine whether the model adequately describes the returns on both
types of funds, 3) determine some variables that affect high yield bond returns and
4) see how the changing structure of the high yield bond market has affected the
returns of junk bond funds.
The remainder of this thesis is divided into five parts. Chapter 2 describes
the high yield bond market. Both the changing structure and the future of the
market are discussed. Chapter 3 discusses previous research in the area of
speculative grade bonds. While most research has shown that junk bonds
outperform higher grade bonds on a realized yield basis, some evidence has been to
the contrary [15]. Chapter 4 discusses the derivation of the regression model used
to study the performance of the mutual funds. Substantial attention has been
3John Curran, Fewer Jitters About Junk Bonds, Fortune, April 29, 1985.
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given to the method by which to describe the returns on bonds and bond portfolios.
However, most research [13], [28], [201 and [1] has shown that corporate bonds
depend on both the equity and government bond markets. Chapter 5 presents my
empirical results. I study eight high yield and five non-high yield bond funds. I find
that neither high yield nor non-high yield bond funds demonstrate superior risk-
adjusted performance during the periods 1973-1976 or 1980-1985. However, for at
least one family of funds, the high yield fund exhibits more systematic risk in the
70's and is less dependent on a maturity premium in the 80's. Chapter 6
summarizes the content of my findings and suggests some implications for future
fields of research in the high yield bond area.
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Chapter 2
An Overview of High Yield Bonds
2.1 The Changing Structure of the Junk Bond Market
Before the late 1970's, most of the outstanding high yield bonds were "fallen
angels", i.e., originally issued as investment grade bonds but later downgraded.
The investment community applied the term "junk bonds" to these securities in
recognition of the problems encountered by the issuers4 . Examples of major issuers
who have "dropped into" the high yield market and then recovered to gain back
investment grade status include Ford Motor, Chrysler and Montgomery Ward.
The first new issues of high yield corporate debt were underwritten by
Lehman Brothers early in 1977. Drexel Burnham Lambert later became the
leading underwriter of these securities.5 The new issue junk bonds were very
different from the fallen angels. The majority of original issue high yields were
from emerging companies who were assigned low ratings because they "lacked a
track record" 6. An investment trade magazine made the following comments
defending original issue high yield bonds:
...by no means do all the securities brought to market with a rating
lower than BB deserve the epithet, junk bonds...Actually, to describe an
issue of a newly emerging growth company as a junk bond can be highly
misleading...To hang the descriptive, junk bond, on an issue merely
4Statement by G.Chris Andersen; Managing Director Drexel Burnham Lambert Incorporated before the
Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs; House
of Representatives; May 3, 1985
5 Report by Congressional Research Service for use of the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer
Protection & Finance of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, US House of Representatives, "The Role of
High Yield Bonds in Capital Markets and Corporate Takeovers: Public Policy Implications", December 1985,
p. 5
6 Ibid, p. 7.
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because the issuer hasn't been around long enough to establish an
investment grade rating is cavalier at best...
According to Drexel Burnham's estimates, over 85 percent of all United
States public corporations, if they were to apply for an agency rating, would be
rated below investment grade. These companies, as of April 1985, included "many
of this country's most rapidly growing and highly creative enterprises, such as
Republic Air, U.S. Home, ARA, Metromedia, Geothermal Resources, John Blair,
Peoples Express, Ingersoll, Middle South Energy, Con Ed, etc. It would be
unfortunate if such companies were denied access to the lowest cost source of
funding available to them."s .
The emergence of original issue speculative grade bonds helped fuel the
growth of the junk bond market. Table 2-I indicates the value of new issue junk
bonds issued from 1977 through 1986 and the growing importance of original issues
in the high yield market.
As you can see from Table 2-I, while the new issue market had been relatively
steady from 1977-1982, the value of new issues has grown tremendously since 1983.
This has been caused by junk bonds issued to finance hostile corporate takeovers.
Since the first junk bond financing was completed in 1983, the high yield bond
market has boomed. Table 2-II indicates the percentages of selected leveraged
buyouts (LBOs) from late 1985 through 1986 financed by high yield bonds.
Table 2-III shows First Boston's estimates for the total value of the leveraged
buyout market in the past four years. As you can see, the LBO market has grown
tremendously since 1983 and junk bonds have helped to finance a large part of this
market.
7 0'Toole, Ed. "Drexel Burnham: The Street's Fastest Growing Investment Bank. Investment Dealer's
Digest, September 11, 1984. p. 14-15.
8 Op cit., G. Chris Andersen, p. 3.
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Table 2-I: Historical Increase in Value of High Yield Bonds
Outstanding and New Issues of High Yield Bonds
Year New Junk Bonds % Junk O/S
Issues Outstanding Due to New Issues
$billions $billions
1970 ---- $6.996
1971 ---- 6.643
1972 ---- 7.106
1973 ---- 8.082
1974 ---- 11.101
1975 ---- 7.720
1976 ---- 8.015
1977 $1.0 8.479
1978 $1.5 9.401
1979 $1.2 10.675
1980 $1.3 15.125
1981 $1.5 17.362
1982 $2.5 18.536
1983 $7.6 28.223
1984 $14.7 41.700
1985 $14.6 N/A
1986 $34.2 1009
N/A: Not available
Sources: First Boston, 1987 p. 23
Morgan Stanley 1985 p.5
0%
0
0
0
0
0
0
11.8
16.0
11.2
8.6
8.6
13.5
26.9
35.3
N/A
34.2
Critics believe that takeovers provide little or no economic benefit and may
force liquidations or restructurings of viable companies by "raiders" who reap
considerable profit and who leave the companies in weakened and highly leveraged
positions. On the other hand, some believe that mergers and acquisitions may
provide economic gains in economies of scale, better management and more
productive allocation of resources."1 In reporting on corporate raider T. Boone
Pickens' bid for Philliphs Petroleum in December 1984, the Wall Street Journal
claimed:
9 approximately
11 Op cit, Report by Congressional Research Service, p. 1.
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Table 2-II: The Proportion of High Yield Debt Financing in Selected
LBO & Recapitalizations - Pro Forma Capitalization
Total
Capitalization
% Capitalization
by High
Yield Debt
Multimedia
Papercraft
Mary Kay
International
905MM
232
304
Controls 441
National Gypsum 1490
BCI Holdings 8268
Eckerd Holdings 1429
Dart Drug 193
FMC Corp. 1929
Macy Merger 4373
Sheller Globe 525
Pacific Lumber 719
JSC/MS Holdings 1226
First Brands 840
Colt Inds. 1831
SSI Holdings 5760
Owens-Corning 2625
Warnaco 543
Fruehauf 2032
Revco (ANAC) 1495
36%
20
2
22
23
19
32
24
32
11
15
46
30
17
11
47
25
47
Average
Source: First Boston, 1987.
Table 2-III: The LBO Market Since 1983
Year Total Value of LBOs
$billions
1983
1984
1985
198610
$1.37
$0.60
$1.68
$3.16
10 through October
Name
8/85
9/85
11/85
12/85
4/86
4/86
4/86
5/86
5/86
5/86
6/86
6/86
9/86
9/86
9/86
10/86
10/86
11/86
12/86
12/86
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Only a corporate Goliath could have attempted that sort of hostile
takeover in days gone by. But in the past year, the acquisition game has
changed, thanks to a new takeover tactic: junk financing. 12
Policy makers have been considering legislation against the use of junk bond
financing and corporate takeovers in general. A number of legislators have been
concerned over the safety of high yield bonds as investments. Senator William
Proxmire stated, "In the event that there is a default on some of these junk bonds
in the future, a number of our Nation's financial institutions may be adversely
affected. I am particularly concerned about stories of problem savings and loan
associations having invested in these bonds..."' 3 . Other legislators have proposed a
temporary moratorium on hostile takeovers financed with high yield bonds, and a
ban on federally insured institutions holding junk bonds. Other bills extend this
prohibition to pension funds.
2.2 Future of the High Yield Market
1985 and 1986 were difficult years for the high yield bond market for several
reasons. In March, 1985, Sharon Steel Corporation failed to make interest
payments on $426 billion in CCC-rated debentures, representing the first large junk
bond default. LTV went bankrupt in July 1986, marking one of the largest defaults
on junk bonds in history. First Boston's High Yield Index showed a negative total
return in July, reflecting the LTV bankruptcy. Arbitrageur Ivan Boesky was found
guilty of insider trading in November 1986, in the most thorough SEC investigation
of insider trading to date. Drexel Burnham Lambert was rumored to be the target
of an SEC probe, both in its ties to Ivan Boesky and its entire junk bond operation.
12 Williams, John D. Takeover Tactics: How 'Junk Financings' Aid Corporate Raiders in Hostile
Acquisitions. Wall Street Journal, December 6, 1984, p. 1.
13 Proxmire, William - Corporate Productivity Act of 1985. Congressional Record, Daily Edition, v. 131,
March 20, 1985.
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However, demand for junk bonds remained strong enough for Drexel to underwrite
$1.5 billion in new high yield debt (including $1 billion for Safeway Stores) in the
three day period surrounding Boesky's arrest. Whether the widening insider
trading scandal will have long range effects on the high yield bond market remains
to be seen.
Many of the incentives that fueled the takeover boom in 1985-1986 will be
gone in the next few years. Specifically, some takeover completions were hastened
in 1986 to avoid the increase in capital gains tax at the end of the year. Since the
capital gains tax has already been increased, this incentive is gone. Also, the
Reagan administration has been "disinclined to invoke antitrust laws14 ." With a
new administration about to take over, this incentive might also disappear. These
factors, along with the possibility of regulations on junk bonds, make the future of
the high yield market very uncertain.
1 4
"Wall Street's Junkies are Hooked on Takeovers", The Economist, November 15, 1986
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Chapter 3
High Yield Bond Research
The grandfather study in the area of high yield bond research is the
"Hickman report" (Hickman, 1958). Hickman showed that low quality bonds
outperformed high quality bonds on a risk-adjusted basis when the bonds were
compared on the basis of realized yields. Hickman showed that the higher promised
returns required from low quality bonds at their offering proved to be more than
sufficient to compensate investors for the higher default rates incurred in the period
1900 through 1943.
Hickman also found that the market tends to undervalue corporate bonds at
or near the date of default. Returns to investors who purchased at default and held
until the issue was extinguished were substantial, averaging 17% for public
utilities, 19% for railroads and 26% for industrials, while losses to investors who
purchased at offering and sold at default were also substantial.
Atkinson (1967) updated Hickman's results for the period 1945 through 1960.
He found that the incidence of defaulted bonds in this period decreased to 0.1% of
total outstanding issues, compared to 1.7% in the period covered by Hickman.
Baskin and Crooch (1968) studied "flat bonds". These are bonds selling
without accrued interest, including both income and defaulted issues, which by
nature have uncertain future cash flows and "can be considered speculative."' 5
They found that there was a high degree of correlation between the historical rates
of return on flat bonds and those earned on common stocks during the years from
15E.F. Baskin and G.M. Crooch, Historical Rates of Return on Flat Bonds, Financial Analysts Journal,
November-December 1968.
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1950 through 1964. They concluded that whatever factors affect rates of returns
on flat bonds must also affect the rates of returns on common stocks. Also, flat
bond rates of return were lower than rates of return on common stocks until 1960.
From 1961-1964, flat bonds outperformed common stocks, probably due to the
severe depression suffered by the railroad industry from 1957 through 1961.
Fitzpatrick and Severiens (1978) confirmed Hickman's findings of superior
performance of low-grade bonds in the period 1965 through 1975. This period
covers both economic recessions and expansions. Their sample included 117 bonds
rated B and BB irrespective of maturities, and omitted bonds in regulated
industries (e.g., railroads, airlines, utilities and pipeline companies). The composite
junk bond yield was adjusted for the annualized default rate. Their results show
that, in almost every year, the composite risk-adjusted junk bond yield provided
higher yields than higher-quality bonds. The yield differential between the rating
classes expanded during periods of economic uncertainty (recessions of 1969-1970
and 1973-1974) more than during periods of liquidity crises (1966 and 1969). Most
defaults took place after the worst of the economic crisis was over, i.e., defaults
tended to come during the recovery.
Altman and Nammacher (1985) further confirmed the finding of superior
performance of high yield bonds over long term government bonds, in the 15 years
from 1970-1984. This period includes the recessions of 1974-1975 and 1981-1982.
$3.6 billion of straight debt defaulted and $5.3 billion of total debt defaulted. The
default rate on straight low-rated debt ranged from .155% in 1981 to 4.488% in
1977, with the average annual rate being 1.6% of par value. Altman and
Nammacher showed that holding a market basket of straight high yield bonds
versus holding the equivalent of Shearson Lehman's Long-Term Government Bond
Index from January 1978 through January 1984 would have resulted in an annual
-17-
compound return spread of over 580 basis points in favor of the high yield bond
portfolio; however, this spread was very sensitive to starting and ending dates.
Ma and Weed (1986) compared the yields-to-maturity on a sample of 47 junk
bonds issued for mergers with the yields on 47 corporate junk bonds issued for other
purposes between March 1980 and September 1985. The study found that the
yield-to-maturity of takeover junk bonds moved closely with that of non-takeover
junk bonds during the period. The yield on takeover bonds, on average, was lower
than that of other junk bonds by less than 50 basis points; however, this difference
was not statistically significant. The results of this study imply that investors in
takeover junk bonds are not investing in lower yielding instruments than non-
takeover junk bonds and that takeover junk bonds are not considered more risky by
the market.
Chandy and Cherry (1983) studied realized yields of junk bonds and
investment grade bonds during periods of rising, stable and falling interest rates.
They found that the realized yields on investment grade bonds exceeded their
promised yields in all three types of market conditions. However, the realized yields
on junk bonds fell below their promised yields in periods of rising interest rates.
They concluded that the default potential in junk bonds received more consideration
in investor decisions during periods of rising interest rates than during other
periods. The yield volatility was greatest for all bonds during periods of rising
rates. Under all market conditions, the yield volatility was greater for junk bonds
than for investment grade bonds. Chandy and Cherry then identified variables
whose movements are closely associated with movements in realized yields on junk
bonds. All variables tested (specifically, coupon rate, yield spread, price, change in
promised yield, promised yield at beginning of period, Standard & Poor's 500 stock
index, promised yield on Aa corporate bonds, maturity and rating) were found to be
correlated with the movements in the realized yield on junk bonds.
-18-
Contrary to this result, Stock and Schrems (1984) found lower grade issues to
be less volatile than investment grade issues. Stock and Schrems claimed that yield
volatility is reduced because of the inverse relationship between credit risk and
cyclical variations in interest rates. Because of the dependence of risk aversion on
the business cycle, they claimed lower grade issues are less volatile than investment
grade issues, in price and in realized monthly returns.
Joehnk and Nielsen (1975) found that the promised yield behavior of low
grade issues favor investing in junk bonds. However, on a realized yield basis, with
an investment horizon less than the term to maturity, in a stable interest rate
environment, the speculative issues were desirable when comparing non-risk
adjusted returns. They were not necessarily desirable when comparing risk
adjusted returns. In addition, in a volatile interest rate environment, the rewards
were even lower. Therefore, they found junk bonds to be inferior on a risk-adjusted
realized yield basis.
The major academic studies discussed above in the area of speculative bonds
have focused on comparing yields on lower quality bonds with yields on higher
quality bonds. The research presented in this paper attempts to quantify the
relative performance of high yield bonds on the basis of a modified capital asset
pricing model in the following chapter.
-19-
Chapter 4
Performance Measurements for Bonds and Bond Portfolios
Several studies [1], [281 and [20] have acknowledged the dependence of
corporate debt on the equity market. The general approach for many of these
studies has been to apply the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964)
and Lintner (1965) to the bond market. The CAPM describes the expected return
on an asset as:
E(Ri) = R,+i(E(Rm-Rf)) (4.1)
E(Ri) = expected return on security i
Rf = return on a riskless asset
E(Rm) = expected return on the market
pi = correlation between returns on security i and the market
In empirical studies using the CAPM, regression analysis is used to estimate
the beta in the equation. Often, Standard & Poor's Composite Index of 500 Stocks
is used as the market index and the return on a 30-day treasury bill is used as the
riskfree rate Rf.
Friend, Westerfield and Granite (1978) constructed an overall market return
index for testing the capital asset pricing model with corporate bond returns. This
index used the New York Stock Exchange Composite index to cover all common
stocks, the Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research index to cover all bonds
other than U.S. Governments and a U.S. Government bond index to cover long term
marketable U.S. government issues. The weights of the indices used to create this
composite index were determined by using annual Federal Reserve Flow of Funds
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data on the market value of stocks and bonds held in the United States. The
findings were inconsistent with the Sharpe-Lintner theory when either stock
returns or bond returns are used as the independent variables. In addition, the
tests demonstrated significantly different relationships for stocks and bonds.
Specifically, the risk-return relationships for bonds implied a lower risk-free rate of
return than for stocks. Surprisingly, the risk-free rate for bonds was closer to the
actual risk-free rate of return for the period, implying that the CAPM better
explained the returns on the bonds than on the stocks.
Alexander (1980) applied the capital asset pricing model to measure the
performance of long-term corporate bonds. Specifically, Alexander used a stock
index, a composite index and a debt index in three separate regressions and found
that the strongest relationship existed between bond returns and the debt index,
and the weakest relationship existed between bond returns and the stock index.
However, significant serial correlation occurred when using the debt index.
Weinstein (1981) demonstrated that the systematic risk of corporate bonds is
related to the interest rate and default risk to which the bondholder is exposed,
where the default risk is measured by the bonds' ratings. This is contrary to those
results reported by Reilly and Joehnk (1976) who found no relationship between the
systematic risk and the ratings for a sample of utility and industrial bonds.
However, as noted by Weinstein, a reason for this difference in findings is that
Weinstein included bonds .with ratings of Ba and B and below (high yield-junk
bonds), while Reilly and Joehnk excluded subinvestment grade bonds from their
sample. While Weinstein's results showed little significance between ratings and
risk at the higher grade classes, the lower grade ratings showed the greatest
correlation with systematic risk, as expected.
The above findings seem to suggest that returns on corporate bonds are not
-21-
well described by the one-period capital asset pricing model. Merton (1974) claimed
that the value of corporate debt depends on three items: (1) the required rate of
return on riskless default-free debt, (2) the provisions and restrictions contained in
the indenture (e.g. maturity date, coupon rate, call terms, etc.) and (3) the
probability that the firm will be unable to satisfy some or all of the indenture
requirements (i.e., the probability of default). Merton demonstrated that corporate
debt can be modeled by a derivation of the Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing
model and that at any point in time, one can duplicate the returns of corporate debt
with some combination of risk-free debt and equity in the issuing firm. More
precisely, if the term structure of interest rates is known, the value of the firm's
debt- and equity will be perfectly correlated with changes in the firm's value.
Although the proof of this claim is beyond the scope of this paper, it follows from
the possible intertemporal effects (Merton 1973) not captured in the one-period
CAPM model.
One model of the returns on a portfolio which takes into account
intertemporal effects and the dependence of corporate debt on firm value was
described by Fuhrman (1978):
Rpt=a +(l•--y)Rft +,Rmt+ y Rt +  (4.2)
Rpt=the return on a portfolio in month t
lt= the return on a long-term default free government bond in month t
Rft= the return on a riskless asset in month t
Rmt= the return on the market portfolio in month t
a, p, y and E are to be estimated from regression
The introduction of this long-term bond captures possible effects due to
interest rate exposures. Fuhrman used this regression on nine different mutual
-22-
funds, studying returns in the months between June 1973 and May 1976. He found
that the returns on the portfolios depend on both the returns on the market and the
returns on the long-term default free government bond, as specified in the above
equation. This is the regression equation I have used in my research.
-23-
Chapter 5
Empirical Study
5.1 Hypotheses
Following the development described in the previous section, I use regression
equation (4.2) in my analysis:
(Rt-Rft)= a +8(Rmt-Rft) + y (Rlt-Rft)+ (5.1)
1. Given the claims by Hickman (1957), Atkins (1968), etc. I test the
hypothesis that the high yield bond funds would demonstrate superior performance.
a hy funds > 0 (5.2)
where a hy funds = a when equation (5.1) is estimated for high yield funds.
2. Since high yield bonds are riskier than non-high yield bonds and the
correlation between returns on a security and returns on the market portfolio
measures systematic risk in the capital asset pricing model, I test whether the
regression coefficient of the equity risk premium is greater with high yield bond
funds than non-high yield bond funds.
f~hy funds >8non-hy funds (5.3)
where phy funds and fnon-hy funds = -- t when equation (4.2) is estimated for
high yield and non-high yield funds respectively.
3. I test whether the regression coefficient of the maturity risk premium
(premium of returns on long-term government bonds over risk-free rate) is greater
for non-high yield bond funds than high yield bond funds. To illustrate this, in the
case of a long-term bond with no default risk, the regression coefficient of the
maturity risk premium would be 1 (i.e., the bond is being regressed upon itself).
-24-
Once default risk is introduced, as in the case of junk bonds, we would expect the
correlation of the bond's returns with the returns on the default-free bond to
decrease.
Y hy funds < Ynon-hy funds (5.4)
where Y hy funds and Y non-hy funds = yA when equation (4.2) is estimated for
high yield and non-high yield funds respectively.
4. I test the hypothesis that high yield bonds behave as if they are equity
(i.e., the regression model collapses to the capital asset pricing model).
Y hy funds = 0 (5.5)
5.2 Data
Monthly data for risk free returns, equity risk premiums and maturity risk
premiums are obtained from the Ibbotson-Sinquefeld database. The high yield
funds selected are CIGNA High Yield Fund (CIG), Dean Witter High Yield
Securities (DWR), High Yield Securities (HY), Kemper High Yield Fund (KEMP),
Keystone Discount Bond Fund B-4 (KB-4), Lord Abbett Bond-Debenture Fund
(LAB), Oppenheimer High Yield Fund (OPP) and Vanguard Fixed Income Fund
(VAN). Descriptions of the high yield funds appear in Appendix A. The non-high
yield funds chosen include Delchester Bond Fund (DEL), Keystone Conservative
Bond Fund B-1 (KB-1), Keystone Investment Grade Bond Fund B-2 (KB-2),
National Bond Fund (NATL), and United Bond Fund (UNI). Descriptions of the
non-high yield funds appear in Appendix B. Monthly data for fund net asset values,
dividends and capital gains paid out was obtained from Wiesenberger's Current
Performance and Dividend Record.
Returns on the mutual funds are calculated as follows:
Rpt = (NAVt + CG t + DIVt-NAVt.1)/NAVt. 1 (5.6)
-25-
where: NAVt = net asset value of fund at beginning of month t
NAVt-1 = net asset value of fund at beginning of month t-1
CGt = capital gains paid out in month t
DIVt = dividends paid out in month t
Two different time periods are used. Group A includes months from June
1973 to May 1976 for the seven funds for which data were available. Group B
includes months from November 1980 to December 1985 for all of the funds with
the following exceptions: 1) I could not obtain the data for May 1985, therefore,
May and June 1985 (since returns in June cannot be computed without May data)
are omitted for all regressions and 2) I could not obtain the data for Vanguard
Fixed Income-High Yield Fund in April 1985 and June 1984. Therefore,
Vanguard's results do not include June 1984, July 1984, April 1985, May 1985 or
June 1985.
The period November 1980 to December 1985 was chosen since the data were
available for all of the high yield mutual funds. The data for June 1973 to May
1976 were available for all the non high yield mutual funds as well as two of the
high yield mutual funds. I attempt to replicate Fuhrman's results on seven funds
in the 1973 - 1976 period. Also, I compare the results in this period to those in the
later period. Aside from replication, the comparison between the two periods is
interesting because of changes in the high yield market, as described in Chapter 2.
It should be noted that my regression results for the 1973-1976 period are not
identical to Fuhrman's results. The significance of all parameters agree with
Fuhrman's results except for the f on the Delchester bond fund, which I find to be
insignificantly different from zero. This could be due to different treatment or
calculation of dividends and capital gains paid out, or to different precise starting
and end periods used.
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5.3 Results
Table 5-I shows the intercepts (a 's) and the corresponding t-statistics for the
periods from June 1973 through May 1976 and from November 1980 through
December 1985. All tests of significance are calculated at the 5% level. For the
period June 1973 through May 1976, the intercepts of the non-high yield funds are
slightly negative while the intercepts of the high yield funds are positive. Almost
all intercepts in the period from November 1980 through December 1985 are
positive. However, none of the intercepts in either period are significantly different
from zero. This result does not allow us to claim that high yield bonds have
abnormal risk-adjusted returns (a hy > 0).
Table 5-II shows the f's and the corresponding t-statistics for the periods
June 1973 through May 1976 and November 1980 through December 1985. The
estimated beta coefficients confirm previous evidence that the market related risks
involved in holding bond portfolios are indeed significant. From 1973 through
1976, estimated betas for the two high yield funds as well as four of the five non-
high yield funds are significantly different from zero. From 1980 through 1985,
seven of the eight high yield funds as well as three of the five non-high yield bond
funds have betas significantly different from zero. The average beta for the high
yield funds is- greater than the average beta on the non high yield funds in both
time periods studied.
Table 5-III shows the regression coefficients on the maturity risk premium
(y's) and the corresponding t-statistics for the periods from June 1973 through May
1976 and from November 1980 through December 1985. During the period from
1973 through 1976, the gammas on one of the two high yield funds as well as four
of the five non-high yield funds are significantly different from zero. From 1980
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Table 5-I: Estimated Abnormal Returns on Bond Funds:
Intercept from Regression Model (5.1)
I. High Yield Funds (t-statistics in parentheses)
Fund 6/73-5/76 11/80-12/85
36obs/fund 60obs/fund
CIG --- .00152
(0.700)
DWR --- .00092
(0.4300)
HY -- .00104
(0.501)
KB-4 .00237 .00149
(0.568) (0.985)
LAB .00511 .00055
(1.330) (0.326)
KEMP --- .00301
(1.490)
OPP --- -. 00041
(-0.189)
VAN --- .00185
(0.646)
II. Non-High Yield Funds
DEL -.00025 .00410
(-0.097) (0.414)
KB-1 -.00148 .00028
(-0.808) (0.193)
KB-2 -.00249 .00053
(-0.797) (0.196)
NATL -.00201 .00018
(-0.611) (0.107)
UNI -.00201 .00160
(-0.978) (1.270)
Note: Sample size for VAN (1980-1985) = 57 observations.
*= significant at 5% level. Note that none of the
t-statistics in this table are significant at 5% level.
through 1985, the gammas on all the high yield funds along with the gammas on
four of the five non-high yield funds are significantly different from zero. Since
-28-
Table 5-I: Estimated Systematic Risk on Bond Funds:
f from Regression Model (5.1)
I. High Yield Funds (t-statistics in parentheses)
6/73-5/76
36obs/fund
0.299
(4.152)'
0.465
(7.019)*
.382
11/80-12/85
60obs/fund
0.168
(2.901)
0.200
(3.510)*
0.231
(4.152)*
0.134
(2.478)*
0.196
(4.851)*
0.314
(6.925)*
0.199
(3.450)*
0.129
(1.689) :
.206
II. Non-High Yield Funds
0.170
(3.900)*
0.390
(1.230)
0.141
(2.618)*
0.335
(5.927)'
0.142
(4.024)*
.197
0.295
(1.115)
0.096
(2.489) :
0.221
(3.035)*
0.108
(2.395)
0.065
(1.944)
.142
Notes:Sample size for VAN (1980-1985) = 57 observations.
= significant at 5% level.
Averages exclude values insignificantly different from 0
bonds with a greater chance of default have a naturally shorter time horizon, as
Fund
CIG
DWR
HY
KEMP
KB-4
LAB
OPP
VAN
Avg f
DEL
KB-1
KB-2
NATL
UNI
Avg f
---- ---------- - -----·· --------- ~  ---- ---- ---- -- -
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expected, the average y for the high yield funds is less than the average y on the
non- high yield funds for both time periods studied.
The R2 values for the estimated regressions for equation (4.2) are presented
in Table 5-IV. The regression model with only two regressors, market returns and
long term government bond returns, explains a substantial proportion of the
variation in returns for most mutual funds. The median R2 is approximately 65%.
A test of the significance of the difference in the coefficients between the high
yield and non-high yield funds, (specifically, 8 and y), is suggested by the higher
average beta for the high yield funds and the lower average gamma for the non-
high yield funds. I run the following regression:
Rpt-Rft = a o + (Rmt-Rft) + y o(Rlt-Rft) + a 1Da + (5.7)
S1Db(Rmt-Rft) + 7 1D g(it-Rft)+ E
where Rft, Rmt, Rlt, Rpt are the same as in previous regressions
a o o, yo, a , 1, y are coefficients to be determined by regression
and Da, Db, Dg are dummy variables that take on the value 0 if the fund is a
non-high yield fund and take on the value 1 if the fund is a high yield fund.
This regression is run by stacking the Keystone B-1, Keystone B-2 and
Keystone B-4 funds. These funds were chosen since I had hoped that by picking
funds in the same family (whose stated goals are high quality, medium quality and
low quality respectively) some of the errors involved in such statistical analyses of
funds are eliminated. Specifically, should an unexpectedly high performance (e.g.
a >0) on a fund result, it could be due to either great performance of the junk (or
non-junk) bonds included in the fund or the superior management ability of the
fund's manager (since these are actively managed funds). By choosing funds in the
same family, I am making the rather crude assumption that the management
ability of the funds managers are approximately equal.
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Table 5-III: Estimated Coefficients on the Maturity
Risk Premium on Bond Funds y from
- Regression Model (5.1)
I. High Yield Funds (t-statistics in parentheses)
6/73-5/76
36obs/fund
0.417
(2.166)*
0.246
(1.386)
.417
11/80-12/85
60obs/fund
0.466
(7.549)*
0.435
(7.178)*
0.317
(5.360)*
0.464
(8.053)*
0.297
(6.905)*
0.239
(4.957).
0.432
(7.046)'
0.467
(5.652)*
.390
II. Non-High Yield Funds
0.520
(4.465)*
0.518
(6.115)'
0.498
(3.465)*
0.256
(1.696)
0.711
(7.512)*
.562
0.215
(0.767)
0.594
(14.473)*
0.368
(4.752)*
0.450
(9.338)*
0.665
(18.539)*
.519
Notes:Sample size for VAN (1980-1985) = 57 observations.
= significant at 5% level.
Averages exclude values insignificantly different from 0
The results of the regression for the two periods are shown in Table 5-V.
Fund
CIG
DWR
HY
KEMP
KB-4
LAB
OPP
VAN
Avg y
DEL
KB-1
KB-2
NATL
UNI
Avg y
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Table 5-IV: R2 Values for Equation (4.2)
Fund 1980-1985 1973-1976
CIG .663 ----
DWR .667 ----
HY .605 ----
KEMP .672
KB-4 .702 .468
LAB .706 .649
OPP .659
VAN .525
DEL .057 .594
KB-1 .851 .585
KB-2 .509 .438
NATL .723 .587
UNI .897 .745
NOTE: --- indicates those funds that did not exist
in the earlier period.
The resulting coefficients on the dummy variables are very interesting. The
intercept is not changed (in the Keystone Family) if the fund was a high yield fund
as compared to a non-high yield fund, as evidenced by the statistically insignificant
a 1's in both periods. However, the slopes of the funds differ. From the period June
1973 through May 1976, the "dummy coefficient" on the market portfolio is
statistically significant, i.e., the high yield fund exhibited higher systematic risk in
the 1973-1976 period than the non-high yield funds. However, during this period
the sensitivity of the fund to the returns on a long-term default free government
bond is essentially unchanged (as evidenced by the statistically insignificant y ).
The results from the November 1980 through December 1985 are the
opposite. While the intercept is still unchanged in this period, the sensitivity of the
returns on the funds decreases with regard to the long-term default free government
bond (if the fund is a high yield fund) but has essentially remained unchanged in its
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Table 5-V: Coefficients from Regression Model (5.7) to
Test the Difference Between High Yield and Non-High Yield
Funds in the Keystone Family
I. June 1973 - May 1976
Coefficient
-.00199
.00436
.08984
.20880
.50796
-.09106
T-Statistic
-0.8850
1.1216
2.3248
3.1196
4.9117
-0.5083
Significant?
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
NO
R2 = .475
Note: Sample size = 108 observations.
Significance tests done at 5% level.
II. November 1980 - December 1985
.00041
.00108
.15840
.03751
.48083
-. 18431
0.2855
0.4393
4.1684
0.5698
1.9002
-2.6336
NO
NO
YES
NO
YES
YES
R2 = .664
Note: Sample size = 180 observations.
Significance tests done at 5% level.
sensitivity to the returns on the market portfolio. Possible explanations for these
results are discussed in Chapter 6.
I also run separate regressions with one dummy variable (i.e., a dummy
variable for alpha, beta and gamma terms were run separately). These tests
---- --- -- -- -- -- -- --- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
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assume that being a high yield fund does not affect the other "non-dummied"
variables in the regression. The results of these tests are identical with the results
of the above regression. It is important to keep in mind that this regression is only
performed on the Keystone family, and the results are not necessarily indicative of
the other funds.
I also run the following regression:
Rpt-Rft= a +B0(Rmt-Rft) + BmedDmed(Rmt-Rft) +lhDhy(Rmt'Rft)+ (5.8)
Y o(Rmt-Rft) + medDmed(alt-Rft) + Y hyDhy(Rlt-Rft) +
to test the difference between the medium grade fund (Keystone B-2) and the
high grade fund (KB-1) and the low grade high yield (KB-4) fund and the high
grade fund
where Dined = 0 if the fund is not a medium grade fund (Keystone B-1 and
Keystone B-4) and 1 if the fund is a medium grade fund (Keystone B-2)
and Dhy = 0 if the fund is not a high yield fund (Keystone B-1 and Keystone
B-2) and 1 if the fund is a high yield fund (Keystone B-4).
The results are shown in Table 5-VI:
Again, these results are very interesting. Of course, the specific results for
the high yield fund are the same as above. However, the results from the dummy
variable Dined terms are surprising. In the period from June 1973 through May
1976, the medium grade fund is not significantly different from the high grade16
fund.
In the period from November 1980 through December 1985, while the
medium grade Keystone B-2 fund is not significantly different from KB-1 in the
fund's sensitivity to the returns on the market portfolio, the medium grade status
16 A high grade fund is a fund that invest in high quality, low yield bonds
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Table 5-VI: Coefficients from Regression Model (5.8) to
Test the Difference Between High Yield, Medium Yield
and Low Yield Funds in the Keystone Family
I. June 1973 - May 1976
-.00053
.03932
.10202
.25833
.51856
-.01838
-.10448
T-Statistic
-0.2902
0.7181
1.3174
3.3360
3.5385
-0.0887
-0.5042
Significant?
NO
NO
NO
YES
YES
NO
NO
R2 = .472
Note: Sample size = 108 observations.
Significance tests done at 5% level.
II. November 1980 - December 1985
a
o
70
Amed
Ahy
Yo
Y med
Y hy
R2 = .679
.00076
.09552
.12492
.10121
.59308
-.22610
-.29495
0.6736
1.8146
1.6785
1.3599
10.6107
-2.8633
-3.7352
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
Note: Sample size = 180 observations.
Significance tests done at 5% level.
does decrease the fund's sensitivity to returns on the long-term default free
government bond.
Value
a
o
,o
fmed
Shy
Yo)'0
Y med
V hy
--------------------------------- ---· --- ---- ~- --~-------------------------------
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5.4 Model Specification Checks
The Durbin-Watson test statistic is used to detect the presence of first-order
serial correlation. The resulting statistics are shown in Table 5-VII. For the period
from 1973 through 1976, the null hypothesis that no serial correlation exists
cannot be rejected. However, from the period 1980 through 1985, serial correlation
does exist for Keystone B-4, Vanguard High Yield Fixed Income and the Delchester
Bond Funds. The Durbin-Watson statistic for the Keystone B-2 fund is
indeterminate. While the presence of positive serial correlation does not affect the
unbiasedness of the regression estimators, it does affect their efficiency.
In order to correct for the presence of serial correlation for the Keystone B-4
High Yield Fund and the Delchester Bond Fund, the Hildreth-Lu procedure is used.
The results of this procedure are shown in Table 5-VIII.
The results of the Hildreth-Lu procedure are not qualitatively different from
those without correction for serial correlation.
F-tests were performed on the seven funds existing in both time periods to
test the hypothesis that the regression error distributions in the two periods are
identical. The results showed that with only three of the funds (Keystone B-4 High
Yield Bond Fund, the Lord Abbett Bond Debenture Fund and the Delchester Bond
Fund) the hypothesis that the returns had the same distribution could not be
rejected. The results are shown in Table 5-IX.
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Table 5-VII: Durbin-Watson Statistics
I. May 1973 - June 1976
High Yield Funds
Fund D-W Statistic
KB-4
LAB
2.119
2.410
Does Serial Correlation Exist?
NO
NO
Non-High Yield Funds
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
II. November 1980 - December 1985
D-W Statistic
2.189
2.033
1.834
2.059
1.432
1.838
2.208
2.588
High Yield Funds
Does Serial Correlation Exist?
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
YES
Non-High Yield Funds
YES
NO
MAYBE
NO
NO
DEL
KB-1
KB-2
NATL
UNI
2.045
2.277
2.105
2.090
1.627
Fund
CIG
DWR
HY
KEMP
KB-4
LAB
OPP
VAN
DEL
KB-1
KB-2
NATL
UNI
2.891
2.288
2.423
1.763
2.172
---- - ----- --- ------~ ~---- - ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- -m w-
~---- --- --- - --- ~-l - -~ ---------- -------- - ----- -------- --w- --- ------
c·---.l ·n ~ruv~.·~*c~.~*;;x~:~·*n;,,r*s,*xlr;, ,-·,a~ ·, ,rcrrrau~-r.*.i*cr7,ri*r*,ws~~,ni=,
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Table 5-VIII: Hildreth-Lu Results: Corrected Coefficients
a. Delchester Bond Fund (November 1980 - December 1985)
T-Statistic
0.4899
1.2086
0.6307
Significant?
NO
NO
NO
b. Keystone B-4 Fund (November 1980 - December 1985)
.00180
.18861
.29184
0.8683
4.9596
7.6300
NO
YES
YES
R2 = .743
Table 5-IX: F-tests Pooling 1973-1976 and 1980-1985 Data
Fund F-statistic From the same period?
High Yield Funds
KB-4
LAB
1.740
3.322
YES
YES
Non-High Yield Funds
DEL
KB-1
KB-2
NATL
UNI
0.130
6.413
4.968
5.507
7.715
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
Note: Sample size = 96 observations.
Significance tests done at 5% level.
Value
.00500
.34512
.18366
R2 = .060
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Discussion of Results
The model used to describe the returns on a portfolio of bonds was
constructed from the riskless asset, the market portfolio and long term default free
debt, using returns on a 30-day Treasury bill, Standard & Poor's Composite Index,
and a long-term default free government bond, respectively, as proxies. Using this
model, certain conclusions can be made about the performance of high yield bonds.
There was no significant indication of superior risk-adjusted performance for
either the high yield mutual funds or the non-high yield mutual funds. This was
demonstrated by the following results: 1) none of the intercepts (a's) on the bond
funds could be found to be significantly different from 0 and 2) the estimated
coefficient of a regression using a dummy variable if the fund was a high yield fund
also was not significantly different from 0 (for the Keystone family of funds).
The correlation of the returns on the funds with the returns on the market
portfolio (as measured by 8) was, on average, higher if the fund was a high yield
fund. This suggests that the high yield status of the fund increases the riskiness of
the fund, as expected. However, when this conclusion was tested with the Keystone
family of funds, while the high yield status of the fund did make the fund riskier in
the period from June 1973 through May 1976, there was no evidence that the fund
was riskier (in terms of default) from November 1980 through December 1985.
The correlation of the returns on the funds with the returns on the long-term
default free government bond (as measured by y) was, on average, lower if the fund
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was a high yield fund. When this result was further tested with the Keystone
family of funds, while the high yield status of the fund did make the fund less
sensitive to the long-term bond during the 1980 through 1985 period, it did not
during the earlier period. Furthermore, the increased sensitivity of the funds to the
market premium and the decreased sensitivity of the fund to the premium on the
long-term default free government bond were in the directions expected. My
hypotheses were that the high yield status of the fund would make the bonds more
dependent on the market and less dependent on the lont-term default free bond-see
Chapter 5).
Why did we get different results for the two periods? Although one cannot
answer this question with certainty, one possible explanation concerns the relative
structure of the high yield bond market during both periods. Recall from chapter 2
that before the 1980's, many of the junk bonds were originally high grade issues
that had been downgraded. After 1980, however, the huge leveraged buyout boom
was the main driving force behind the high yield bond market. Since the premium
of the returns on a long-term default free government bond is, essentially, a
maturity risk premium, the investors in bonds would be more sensitive to the
maturity risk premium if the bonds are expected to be outstanding for a long period
of time. If the bonds are expected to be retired tomorrow, for example, then they
will not be priced to reflect interest rates in seven years. Therefore, one
explanation for the decreased sensitivity of the premium of the fund to the premium
of the long-term default free bond in the 1980's is that for some reason investors
expect high yield bonds to remain outstanding for shorter periods of time than in
the 1970's.
This is plausible when one considers that usually in leveraged buyouts, the
object is to decrease the amount of debt as soon as possible. Many companies try to
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repurchase the junk bonds issued to finance a leveraged buyout as soon as possible.
Therefore, the investors' time horizons might be shorter if they expect the company
to repurchase the bonds. In contrast, the investors of many of the "fallen angel"
junk bonds of the 1970's bought the bonds of high grade firms and, therefore, were
planning to hold the bonds for a long period of time.
Regression (5.8) with dummy variables for both medium grade bond funds
and junk bond funds shows that in the November 1980 through December 1985
period, both medium and high yield bond funds were less sensitive to the long-term
default free government bond. During the period from June 1973 through May
1976, only the high yield bond fund exhibited greater sensitivity to the market
portfolio. This suggests that for the fund to be "extra-sensitive" to the premium on
the market portfolio, the bonds had to be very low quality (since the medium grade
status had no effect on the ,). However, in the 1980's, even a fund of slightly worse
quality would decrease the sensitivity to the maturity risk premium, i.e., investors
had a longer time horizon only with top quality funds.
A similar scenario can be described for the difference in results from the
1970's to the 1980's on the market risk of junk bonds. If the investor had bought
the bond of a formerly high grade company which is now a junk issue, obviously
something has happened to the firm to make the rating decrease drastically. The
investor might then become more sensitive to, as Merton [20] described, the "firm's
value." Since the bond has essentially become more sensitive to this value (or
default risk), the bond might behave more like equity. Therefore, the sensitivity of
the bond to the equity market will increase. My results indicate that in the 1970's,
when the junk bonds were "fallen angels", the A's of the funds differ. However,
investors in junk bonds in the 1980's are usually buying into either original issue
junks, or junks issued as part of the company restructuring.
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Is it a good assumption that the "1980's junk investor" is less sensitive to
default risk than he was in the 1970's? The two largest junk defaults yet have
occurred during the past two years. The default by Sharon Steel and the default by
LTV shook the high yield market. The data used in this study are not recent
enough to include the LTV default, nor did it include the months after the Ivan
Boesky insider trading scandal. Several predictions have been that the leveraged
buyout boom will lead to many bankruptcies in the next several years. If this
proves to be the.case, my guess is that investors that are not looking at default risk
will be surprised.
6.2 Methodological Problems
While the possible conclusions to be drawn from the results of this study are
interesting, several caveats should be mentioned.
First, I must stress again that the results of the different sensitivities of the
funds to the stock and long-term government bond markets were only for the
Keystone family of funds and, therefore, are not necessarily representative of the
other funds studied.
Second, the data for this report are for junk bond funds, and not junk bonds.
The funds are not necessarily representative of the junk bond market for several
reasons. The funds do not have to invest all of their assets in junk bonds (as shown
in the description of the funds - Appendix A). Also, the funds are run by different
managers. While I did not interview the managers, it is probably safe to assume
that while one fund manager could include in his portfolio a representative mix of
the junk bond market, another manager could be extremely distrustful of leveraged
buyout junk bonds and include none of these in his portfolio. If this were the case
-42-
with the Keystone B-4 fund manager, then our scenario seems a little ridiculous.
One possible line to follow-up on this study is to find out exactly what the makeup
is of normal corporate high yield bonds and leveraged buyout high yield bonds.
However, Ma and Weed [ 17], found that there is not a difference in the two types of
junk bonds.
Third, the regression model assumes that the systematic risk and the interest
risk are constant over the period. As Fuhrman [131 stated, this is clearly violated
since the average maturity of the portfolio and the average riskiness of the bonds
are important decision variables. Any actively managed fund will violate these
necessary statistical conditions. If we were to know the assets in the fund at all
times, we could run a new regression each time the risk level is changed.
Alternatively, since risk levels do change over time, it might be wise to make the
measurement period short (i.e., daily observations)' 7 .
6.3 Summary
While one should be careful not to generalize the results of this study to the
whole junk bond market, in the case of at least one bond family, a junk bond fund
exhibited different behavior in the 1980's than it did in the 1970's. I believe that
this difference in behavior was caused by the changing junk bond market.
Since, most likely, the structure of the high yield bond market in the future
will again be drastically changed because of a great deal of uncertainty in
regulations and the economy, it would be very interesting to compare the results of
this study with a similar study a decade from now.
17Robert Fuhrman. Performance Measurement for Bond Portfolios, June 1978
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Appendix A
High Yield Funds - Source: Wiesenberger
A.1 CIGNA HIGH YIELD FUND, INC.
CIGNA High Yield Fund, formerly INA High Yield Fund, is a diversified open-
end management investment company with the primary objective of as high a level
of current income from investments in fixed-income securities as is consistent with
the assumption of moderate credit risk. investments are largely debt securities in
the "B" range of rating by the rating services.
At the end of 1984, the fund had 86.4% of its assets invested in senior
securities, of which the substantial proportion was in five industry groups:
consumer goods and retail trade (15.5% of assets, entertainment & leisure (11%),
transportation (9.8%), communications (9.3%) and utilities (9.1%). By type, the
major commitments were in debentures (36.6% of assets), subordinate notes (23.8%)
and mortgages (16.5%). The rate of portfolio turnover in the latest fiscal year was
137% of average assets. Unrealized appreciation in the portfolio at the calendar
year-end was 0.9% of total net assets.
A.2 DEAN WITTER HIGH YIELD SECURITIES INC.
The fund is an open-end diversified management investment company that
was first offered in September 1979 as InterCapital High Yield Securities. The
present name was adopted in March 1983.
The primary investment objective is a high level of current income. Capital
appreciation is a secondary objective but only when this does not interfere with the
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pursuit of high income. Investments consist principally of fixed income securities
which are rated in the lower categories by established rating services or issues
nonrated, but of comparable quality.
At the end of 1984, the fund had 91.3% of assets in corporate debt securities,
of which a substantial proportion was in five industry groups: health care (12.8%
of assets), electric utilities (11.5%), entertainment, gaming & lodging (11%),
transportation (9.6%), and diversified manufacturers (8%). Debentures represented
82.9% of assets and convertible issues accounted for 8.4%. The rate of portfolio
turnover during the latest fiscal year was 121% of average assets. Unrealized
depreciation amounted to 4.9% of calendar year-end assets.
A.3 HIGH YIELD SECURITIES, INC.
High Yield Securities was organized in July 1977 and shares were first
publicly offered in September of the same year. The fund's objective is primarily the
highest level of current income in fixed income securities not believed to involve
undue risk. Securities offering the high yields sought are ordinarily in the lower
rating categories or are unrated. Capital growth will also be considered, but only
when consistent with the primary objective of high current income.
At the close of 1984, the fund had 92% of its assets in bonds and preferred
stocks. Principal holdings were debentures (79% of assets), convertible debentures
(8%), and convertible preferred stocks (5%). Over half of the assets were
concentrated in five industry groups: multiple industry (18% of assets), domestic
oil(13%), retail sales (9%), broadcasting & publishing (6%) and leisure time (5%).
The rate of portfolio turnover during the latest year was 48,6% of assets.
Unrealized depreciation amounted to 7,7% of year-end assets.
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A.4 KEMPER HIGH YIELD FUND, INC.
The fund invests primarily in corporate bonds and other debt securities with
the primary objective of providing the highest level of current income with capital
gains as a secondary objective. The high yield securities sought by the fund will
ordinarily be in the lower rating categories of the established rating services or will
be unrated.
At the end of 1984, the fund had 91.8% of its assets in senior securities, of
which the sizeable proportion was in five industry groups: utilities (12.1% of
assets), finance & insurance (11%), communications & media (10.9%), oil & gas
(10.8%) and leisure time (8%). Non-convertible corporate obligations, at 86.3%, was
the major portfolio component. The rate of portfolio turnover in the latest fiscal
year was 78% of average assets. Unrealized depreciation in the portfolio at the
calendar year-end was 1.6% of total net assets.
A.5 KEYSTONE DISCOUNT BOND FUND: B-4
Keystone B-4 invests its assets in bonds selected with the objective of securing
a generous income return. The portfolio will ordinarily include a substantial
representation in bonds which, as a class, sell at discounts from par value. The
portfolio may also contain short-term money market instruments, which may seem
appropriate to achieve the fund's investment objective.
At the end of the 1984 year, the fund had 93% of its assets in bonds, of which
the substantial proportion was in five areas: industrials (36.3% of assets), non-
telephone utilities (7.8%), private placements (7.6%), banks & finance (6.9%) and
transportation (5.6%). Debentures constituted 25.8% of assets and convertibles
were 21%. The rate of portfolio turnover in the latest fiscal year was 36% of
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average assets. Unrealized depreciation in the portfolio at the calendar year-end
was 6.2% of total net assets.
A.6 LORD ABBETT BOND-DEBENTURE FUND, INC.
The fund made its initial public offering on March 19, 1971, but shares were
not continuously available to the public until May 1, 1972. The investment
objective of the fund is to provide a high current income and the opportunity for
capital appreciation to produce a high total return through a professionally
managed portfolio consisting primarily of convertible or discount debt securities and
convertible debentures, many of which are lower rated.
At the end of 1984, the fund had 95.9% of its assets in bonds and preferred
stock, of which a sizeable proportion was in five industry groups: utilities (17.9% of
assets), oil (10.7%), transportation-airlines and drugs (6.7% each) and steel (5.1%).
A breakdown of portfolio composition showed 35.9% of assets in low grade straight
debt, 17.9% in low grade convertible debentures, 17.8% in high grade convertible
debentures, 11.3% in convertible preferreds and 10.3% in investment grade (AAA-
BBB) straight debt. The rate of portfolio turnover in the latest fiscal year was
64.2% of average assets. Unrealized depreciation in the portfolio at the calendar
year-end was 7.6% of total net assets.
A.7 OPPENHEIMER HIGH YIELD FUND, INC.
The fund was incorporated in July 1978 and initially offered its shares in
August of the same year. Its primary objective is to earn a high level of current
income by investing primarily in a diversified portfolio of high yield fixed-income
securities (long-term debt and preferred stock issues, including convertibles)
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believed not to involve undue risk. As a secondary objective, the fund seeks capital
growth. It may invest up to 10% of its assets in restricted issues and to the same
limit may lend its portfolio securities to selected brokers, dealers and other financial
institutions. At the end of 1984, the fund had 96.3% of its assets in fixed income
securities of which non-convertible issues represented 82.8% of assets and
convertibles 10.7%. The five largest industry commitments were utilities (9.8% of
assets), airlines (7.9%), financial services (6.9%), leisure (6.8%), and petroleum and
natural gas (6.4%). The rate of portfolio turnover during the latest fiscal year was
84.8% of average assets. Unrealized depreciation at the calendar year-end was
8.6% of total net assets.
A.8 VANGUARD FIXED INCOME SECURITIES FUND - High Yield Bond
Portfolio
Vanguard Fixed Income Securities Fund, (formerly Westminster Bond Fund,
became a series fund on December 27, 1978 offering two separate portfolios,
"Investment Grade" and "High Yield Bond Portfolio." This comprises a diversified
portfolio of high yielding medium and lower-quality bonds, with the objective of
providing the highest level of current income available without assuming undue
risk.
At the end of 1984, the High Yield portfolio had 98% of its assets in bonds, of
which a major proportion was in five industry areas: industrials (43.5% of assets),
communications & entertainment (13,8%), industrial medical (10.5%), industrial
energy (9.3%) and banks & finance (3.4%). The rate of portfolio turnover in the
latest fiscal year was 82% of average assets. Unrealized depreciation at the
calendar year-end was 0.1% of total net assets.
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Appendix B
Non-High Yield Mutual Funds - Source: Wiesenberger
B.1 DELCHESTER BOND FUND
Delchester Bond Fund was organized in May 1970 and its shares initially
offered to the public in August of the same year. The present name of the fund was
adopted in June 1973.
The primary objective of the fund is "to earn and pay shareholders as liberal
a current income as is consistent with providing reasonable safety in the value of
their investment." At least 80% of the fund's assets must be invested in bonds,
U.S. Government securities and commercial paper, while the balance may be
invested in other income-producting securities. At the end of 1984, the fund had
92.1% of its assets in senior securities, of which the major proportion was in
industrial issues (66% of assets), electric utility (18%) and financi (8%). Debentures
represented 63% of assets; sinking fund bonds were 13%, mortgages and notes were
8% each. The rate of portfolio turnover during the latest fiscal year was 117% of
average assets. Unrealized depreciation amounted to 1.3% of calendar year-end
assets.
B.2 KEYSTONE CONSERVATIVE BOND FUND: B-1
Keystone B-1 seeks as high a level of income as is feasible, consistent with
preservation of principal, through investing in high and good grade bonds and
short-term money-market instruments. It may invest in domestic, foreign and
restricted securities.
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At the close of 1984, the fund had 76% of its assets in bonds, of which the
major proportion was concentrated in five investment areas: non-telephone utilities
(24% of assets), U.S. Government issues (16.4%), telephone utilities (13.6%),
industrials (13%) and banks & finance (10.5%). Debentures constituted 21.9% of
assets, dated bonds were 17.4%, foreign debt issues were 16.4% and convertibles
were 10.8%. The rate of portfolio turnover in the latest fiscal year was 72% of
average assets. Unrealized appreciation was 2.7% of total net assets at the
calendar year-end.
B.3 KEYSTONE INVESTMENT GRADE BOND FUND: B-2
Keystone B-2 seeks maximum income without undue risk of principal by
investing in bonds which are normally characterized by liberal returns and
moderate price fluctutations. The portfolio may contain short-term money market
instruments. While emphasis is on income, consideration is given to security of
principal, marketability and diversification.
At the end of 1984, the fund had 84.3% of its assets in straight bonds,
including 11.3% in U.S. Government bonds, of which the major industry
commitments were industrials (20% of assets), banks & Finance (10.4%), non-
telephone utilities (6.8%) and transportation (5.1%). Foreign bonds constituted
14.7%. The rate of portfolio turnover in the latest fiscal year was 117% of average
assets. Unrealized appreciation in the portfolio at the calendar year-end was 1.2%
of total net assets.
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B.4 NATIONAL BOND FUND
The objective of National Bond Fund, organized in 1940, is to provide an
investment in a diversified group of bonds, including convertible bonds, which are
slected for income. The level of interest coverage and the indicated marketability of
the bonds are the major qualifications in the selection of issues for the fund's
portfolio.
At the end of 1984, the fund had 95% of its assets in corporate bonds, of
which the major proportion was in five industry groups: electric utilities (22% of
assets), oil & oil services and finance & insurance (12% each), gas pipelines (8%)
and retail trade (7%). By types, 70% of holdings were debentures and 23% were
first mortgages. The rate of portfolio turnover in the latest fiscal year was 102% of
average assets. Unrealized depreciation at the fiscal mid-year on October 31 was
2.2% of total net assets.
B.5 UNITED BOND FUND
United Bond Fund was initially offered in March 1964 as a medium for
investors primarily interested in a portfolio of fixed-dollar securities offering a
reasonable return with more emphasis on preservation of capital invested. Only
debt securities may be purchased for the portfolio. The fund may lend securities up
to 10% of total assets.
At the close of 1984, the fund had 77% of its assets in bonds, of which 48%
were industrials, 12.4% in electric utilities, 9% in insurance & finance obligations
and 5.2% in communication utilities. Of the 23% in net cash and equivalent, the
bulk (16.8% of assets) was in U.S. Government issues. The rate of portfolio
turnover in the latest fiscal year was 97.2% of average assets.
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